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The prohibition on using others ‘merely asmeans’ is one of the best-known
and most influential elements of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. But it is
widely regarded as impossible to specify with precision the conditions
under which this prohibition is violated. On the basis of a re-examination
of Kant’s texts, the article develops a novel account of the conditions for
using someone ‘merely as a means’. It is argued that this account has not
only strong textual support but also significant philosophical advantages
over alternative conceptions.
Keywords: Formula of Humanity, Immanuel Kant, Kantian ethics,
‘using merely as a means’, consent, practical reasoning
1. Introduction
The prohibition on using persons ‘merely as means’ has been one of the
most influential elements of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. For example,
it has been invoked in struggles against slavery and other forms of exploi-
tation, and it informs important ethical codes governing medical research
on human subjects (Altman : –). It is widely understood to mean
that there is an absolute moral limit to what we may do to one another
(and to ourselves) in the service of our ends, no matter how desirable or
important those endsmay be. The prohibition is regarded as clearly appli-
cable in paradigmatic cases such as enslavement or the secret subjection
of individuals to dangerous medical experiments. It is widely regarded as
impossible, however, to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions
for using another person ‘merely as a means’ in a way that does not yield
problematic implications for other sets of relevant cases. As a result, the
prohibition on using personsmerely asmeans is widely considered unable
to provide concrete moral guidance.
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In this article, I develop a new interpretation of the meaning of the
prohibition that yields a clear specification of the conditions under which
agents use other persons ‘merely as means’. I first discuss the problems
connected with four different readings of the prohibition, found in the
literature (section ). In section , I develop the new proposal in three
steps. I argue, on the basis of textual evidence, that () Kant’s phrase con-
cerns an agent’s ‘using’ others merely as means, rather than ‘treating’
them as such; () the phrase articulates amoral constraint on the agent’s
practical reasoning, such that the agent ought to make his use of others
conditional on their consent, as a matter of moral principle; and () the
relevant type of consent is genuine actual consent to being used as means
to the agent’s ends in a specific way. In section , I show that this
interpretation avoids the problems associated with other readings, and
in section  I consider an important objection.
My aim in this article is limited to determining what, according to Kant,
constitutes using others ‘merely as a means’. Kant’s conception of using
oneselfmerely as ameansmerits separate treatment because it requires an
examination of the relation between the ‘using self’ and ‘used self’, includ-
ing a consideration of the sense in which one can give or deny consent to
oneself. Furthermore, I do not discuss Kant’s justification of the claim
that it is indeed morally impermissible to use others merely as means,
because doing so requires an article of its own. I must therefore also defer
discussion of objections to Kant’s claim that using others merely as
means is absolutely prohibited. Here my focus is on the prior issue of
the meaning of the phrase and the associated prohibition.
2. Problems with Current Accounts of ‘Using Someone Merely as
Means’
We often use others as means to our ends. To mention one of Kant’s
examples, youmay use amason as ameans to build a house, and amason
may use you as ameans to obtain money (L-NR, : ). Not all forms
of using others as means are morally permissible, however. Kant argues
that using a person ‘merely as means’ is morally prohibited.
The classic formulation of this injunction is the Formula of Humanity in
the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:
So act that you use the humanity, whether in your own person or
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means. (G, : )
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Strictly speaking, the prohibition mentioned at the end of the formula
concerns the use of the ‘humanity in a person’. By ‘humanity’ Kant here
understands that which distinguishes humans from other animals, and
this is their capacity to act in accordance with rational principles
and to set ends independently of inclination (G, : –, ;
CPrR, : ). This capacity is inseparable from the other elements that
together make up a human being, which makes it possible for Kant to
speak of using ‘a human being’ or ‘a person’ instead of ‘the humanity
in a person’ – just as I can say, when using one particular program on
my computer, that I am using my computer. Kant also asserts, on similar
grounds, that someone who uses a part of another person’s body can be
said to use the person (Eth-C, : –; cf. MM, : ). Hence he
often speaks of ‘using a person merely as a means’ or ‘using another
human being merely as a means’ (G, : ), and in this article I shall
do the same.
Kant illustrates the prohibition on using others ‘merely asmeans’with the
example of an agent who contemplates acting on the following maxim:
‘when I believe myself to be in need of money, I shall borrow money and
promise to pay it back, even though I know that this will never happen’.
He explains:
[H]e who has it in mind tomake a false promise to others will see
at once that he wants to make use of another human being
merely as a means, without the other at the same time containing
in himself the end. For he whom Iwant to use for my purposes by
such a [false] promise cannot possibly consent to my way of
behaving toward him and so himself contain the end of this
action. (G, : –)
This comment is brief, but it clearly suggests that the prohibition against
using others ‘merely asmeans’ should be understood in terms of a consent
requirement. It is less clear, however, how this requirement should be
specified more precisely. Is the problem that the lender has not given
consent to the agent, that he could not rationally give consent, or that
he does not have the option of giving or withholding genuine consent
in the first place, since he is being deceived? Does the relevant consent
concern the agent’s action, his maxim or the use he wants to make of
the other? In other words: what is the relevant kind of consent, and what
is the proper object of consent? Let us first consider four different answers
that can be found in the literature.
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2.1. Actual Consent to Being Used, in a Particular Manner, as a
Means to the Agent’s End
Kant’s statement that the false promisor uses the lender without the latter
‘at the same time containing in himself the end’ could be taken to indicate
that you use others merely as means if and only if you use them as means
without their actual consent to being used, in this way, as ameans to your
end. If a lender agrees to lend his money, on the basis of a borrower’s
promise that he will repay the loan, then he ‘simultaneously contains
the borrower’s end’ in the sense that he has adopted the borrower’s
end, that is the borrower’s end of temporarily getting to use his money.
If the promise is false, however, then he does not contain the quasi-
borrower’s end, since he is not aware of the latter’s real end.
In addition to making good sense of Kant’s example, the actual consent
reading also seems to be textually supported by passages outside the
Groundwork. According to the Metaphysics of Morals, a loan, as such,
requires the simultaneous declaration of will by both parties, and this
includes the actual consent of the lender to the borrower’s using his
money (MM, : –, esp. ). Another case is the use of servants,
which, as Kant states repeatedly, requires the servants’ actual consent
(e.g. L-NR, : , MM, : -; I discuss these examples in more
detail below).
When the criterion is read as only requiring actual consent, however, it is
widely regarded as unsatisfactory. A first cause for concern is the fact that
someone’s actual consent may be spurious, for example when it is the
result of manipulation or deception (O’Neill : –). If an agent
produces consent in these morally impermissible ways, then surely the
other’s (spurious) consent does not show that the agent is not using
the other merely as a means. This worry regarding spurious consent is
no ground for rejecting an actual consent criterion, however, for it can
be put to rest – at least in principle, even if perhaps not fully in
practice – by spelling out the requirements for genuine actual consent
and restricting the relevant consent to the latter.
Other authors claim that on an actual consent reading Kant’s criterion
rules out too much. An example discussed in the literature is that of a
collapsed jogger in a park who is neither conscious nor breathing.
Since she is unconscious, the jogger cannot consent to CPR treatment
(and it is tacitly assumed that she is not carrying a living will). Some
commentators have argued that, on the actual consent interpretation
of Kant’s criterion, therefore, you would be treating her merely as a
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means if you resuscitated her to save her life. Understandably, this result
seems implausible (cf. Kerstein : ; Formosa : , –).
The actual consent reading also seems to rule out too little, however.
Imagine a scenario in which a genocidal dictator selects several individ-
uals from the ethnic group she is annihilating, in order to subject them to
dangerous medical experiments that promise to yield valuable medical
insights that would benefit the rest of humanity. Now suppose that
one of the selected individuals happens genuinely to consent to the
treatment— say, a radical act-utilitarian who is convinced of the experi-
ment’s overwhelming benefits for large numbers of humans in the long
run and who believes that these benefits vastly outweigh his own agony.
The genocidal dictator does not care one bit whether any of the selected
individuals give consent, and she assumes they do not. When she hears of
the act-utilitarian’s consent, she laughs with contempt. It sounds odd to
say that she uses all of these individuals except the act-utilitarian ‘merely
as a means’. After all, she treats each of them in the same way, for the
same reason, in the service of the same end and regardless of whether they
give consent. As a result, it is hard to see how the act-utilitarian’s consent
could make a major moral difference in the description of the dictator’s
manner of acting. It seems that his consent is not appropriately related to
her manner of acting for it to affect the moral status of her way of
using him.
Similar worries can be raised concerning the use of a personwho consents
to being enslaved or the use of an enslaved person who consents in a
particular case.
2.2. Possible Rational Consent to Being Used, in a Particular Manner,
as a Means to the Agent’s End
A second option is to take the relevant type of consent to be possible
rational consent to being used, in a particular manner, as a means to
the agent’s end. On this reading, you use others merely as means if
and only if you use them in a way to which they could not rationally con-
sent. You do not do so if you use them as means in the service of what can
be rationally chosen or what is rationally required, even if this involves
overriding their de facto dissent.
Derek Parfit’s reading of Kant seems close to this view, since he reads
Kant as defending the principle that it is ‘wrong to treat anyone in any
way to which this person could not rationally consent’ (Parfit :
vol. , ). Parfit claims that on Kant’s principle youwould not be using
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a heavymanmerely as ameans if you unilaterally decided to push him off
a footbridge in order to stop a runaway trolley from killing five others.
After all, Parfit argues, the heavy man could rationally consent to being
killed as a means to saving the five, given the overall consequences: a net
saving of four lives. Parfit considers this alleged result to be a reason for
rejecting Kant’s principle (–, esp. –).
Themost obvious problem for this reading of the Formula ofHumanity is
its lack of textual support. Kant does not argue anywhere that it is
sometimes morally permissible to kill, to steal or to make false promises
as long as the victim could rationally consent. Parfit relies solely onKant’s
comment, in his explanation of the false promising example, that the
lender ‘cannot possibly’ contain the promisor’s end (Parfit : vol. ,
, , ). This comment does not specify the type of impossibility
at issue, however, and it is perfectly compatible with the actual consent
interpretation above, as well as with the other readings discussed below.
Thus, Kant’s comment that the lender ‘cannot possibly’ consent offers no
textual support for the possible rational consent reading as such.
Moreover, Kant’s categorical rejection of certain types of action, such
as his unconditional condemnation of theft, clearly runs counter to the
possible rational consent interpretation. It is not surprising, therefore,
that most Kantians and Kant scholars reject rational consent interpreta-
tions of what it is to use someone ‘merely as a means’ (e.g. Kerstein :
–; Nyholm : –; O’Neill : ; Pallikkathayil :
–).
2.3. Possible Consent to the Action
A third option is to explicate the meaning of Kant’s phrase in terms of the
in-principle impossibility of (actual) consent. Here the idea is that you use
others merely asmeans if and only if it is impossible for them to consent to
your action, given the nature of your action.
This is the sense in which Christine Korsgaard analyses Kant’s comment
that the lender in theGroundwork example ‘cannot possibly’ contain the
false promisor’s end. Korsgaard explains that the lender clearly cannot
possibly consent to what the false promisor is really doing, since he is
being deceived. And suppose the lender sees through the false promise:
then it is no longer possible for him to accept it as a promise – at most
he might pretend to (Korsgaard : –). Korsgaard argues that
‘[t]he action is one that by its very nature is impossible for the other to
assent to’ and concludes that the agent uses the lender merely as a means
(; emphasis added). The ‘criterion for judging whether you are
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treating [another] as ameremeans’ is ‘whether another can assent to your
way of acting’ (: ; emphasis added). She emphasizes that the
focus is not on the absence of consent but on its impossibility: the problem
is not ‘that the other person does not or would not assent to the transac-
tion or that she does not happen to have the same end I do, but strictly
that she cannot do so: that something makes it impossible’ ().
When construed in this third way, however, the scope of Kant’s phrase
seems too narrow. There is an important class of cases of violence that
seem to involve the use of others merely as a means, although the nature
of the action does not make it impossible, for the person who is used, to
consent. Consider, for example, the action of using a healthy person’s
organs, thereby killing him, in order to save the lives of five others.
Does this constitute a case of using the person merely as a means? On
Korsgaard’s account, the question here is not whether the person does
or would consent, but ‘strictly’ whether the person can consent given
the nature of the action. In contrast to the false promising example, here
the nature of the action does not make it impossible for the victim to con-
sent. If, in a spirit of radical altruism, he did consent, the agent’s action
would still be properly described as using his organs to save five others,
thereby killing him. It follows from Korsgaard’s account of the
prohibition, therefore, that organ harvesting does not qualify as using
the victim ‘merely as a means’, not even when the victim does not or
would not consent. Yet passages elsewhere, such as Kant’s discussion
of using another person’s sexual organs (MM, : ) and his moral con-
demnation of removing one’s tooth for transplantation into the mouth of
another (: ), clearly suggest that on Kant’s understanding of the
notion, organ harvesting should count as using someone merely as a
means –most certainly when a person does not or would not consent.
2.4. Possible Consent to the Agent’s Maxim
A fourth option is to read Kant’s criterion as requiring possible consent to
the agent’s maxim. On this account, you use others merely as means if
and only if they cannot consent to your maxim.
This reading can be found in the work of Onora O’Neill and Thomas
Hill. O’Neill claims that in the false promising case, ‘the victim of deceit
cannot agree to the initiator’s maxim, so is used’ (O’Neill : ).
She writes: ‘To use another as mere means, as Kant sees it, is to act on a
maxim that the other cannot also adopt. This amounts to acting on a
maxim that one cannot at the same time will as universal law’ (;
original emphasis). The focus, on her account, extends to anyone who
HOW TO USE SOMEONE ‘MERELY AS A MEANS ’
VOLUME 25 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW 395
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000229
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.208.65.212, on 14 Aug 2020 at 11:04:11, subject to the
is ‘involved in some way’ or ‘affected’ by your action (, n.), and the
relevant question is whether they can agree to yourmaxim. Hill defends a
similar view, claiming that it is ‘not relevant’ whether they happen to
adopt your end (Hill : ).
This fourth reading of Kant’s phrase faces difficulties too, since its scope
seems too wide. Many actions that do not involve any use of others at all
would qualify as ‘using’ others ‘merely as means’. Suppose, for example,
that you have amaxim of never helping anyone in need (cf.G, : ) and
that you let me drown while I am crying out for help, although you could
easily save my life. In terms of this fourth reading of ‘using merely as a
means’, you would be using me merely as a means if you let me drown.
After all, I am clearly affected, and since I want help I cannot agree to your
maxim of never helping. You are not usingme as ameans, however, when
you refuse to help, and it makes little sense to say that you are using me
‘merely as a means’ when you are not even using me ‘as a means’. Kant
indeed explicitly denies that the egoist in the fourth Groundwork exam-
ple, who refuses to help anyone in need, uses this person merely as a
means (: ). So, on the fourth reading of the criterion, its scope seems
too wide.
2.5. Denying the Problem or Revising the Principle
As a result of the difficulties associated with these four interpretations,
many authors view it as impossible to provide a satisfactory reading of
Kant’s prohibition, but some deny that this is a problem. Some commen-
tators downplay the importance of those few words at the end of the
Formula of Humanity: ‘never merely as a means’. AllenWood, for exam-
ple, asserts that ‘far too much’ is made of the claim that we must never
treat humanity merely as a means (Wood : ). He maintains that it
is impossible to derive any concrete duties on its basis and that Kant’s
claim actually ‘plays no role whatever’ in the content of the formula
(Wood : ).
The assertion that Kant’s claim plays no role is hard to square, however,
with his explicit division of his four Groundwork examples into two
pairs. As Kant explains it, the first pair includes cases in which the agent
contravenes the humanity in a person by using it merely as means; the
second pair includes cases in which the agent only fails to promote
humanity as an end in itself (: –). If we follow Wood and read
the formula simply as the injunction that we ought always to promote
humanity as an end in itself, then this division becomes unintelligible.
In each of the four examples the agent fails to promote humanity as
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an end in itself, so in that regard there is no relevant difference between
the two pairs.
Moreover, Kant repeats the prohibition on using persons ‘merely as
means’ many times, also in later works, and he appeals to it for the pur-
pose of identifying concrete moral duties and prohibitions. In the
Groundwork, he offers not only the example of promising falsely to
repay a loan but also that of ‘assaults on the freedom and property of
others’ (: ). In the Doctrine of Right, he discusses cases in which
contracts are required to avoid using others merely as means (MM, :
-), and in the Doctrine of Virtue he explicates the prohibition on
using others merely as means in terms of a specific duty of virtue, namely
the duty of respect for the humanity in the person of another (: ,
). In sum, Kant appears to attribute more significance to the
prohibition than Wood claims he does.
This still leaves open the possibility, of course, that the prohibition does
indeed play an important role in Kant’s work but that the associated
problems cannot be solved. This is the view defended by Samuel
Kerstein, the author of the most extensive discussion of the notion of
‘using merely as a means’ to date (Kerstein ). On his view, Kant’s
prohibition, in its original form, has implausible implications. He recom-
mends revising and ‘de-absolutizing’ it, such that it serves as a pro tanto
principle that can be ‘outweighed by some other moral reason’ (Kerstein
: , cf. : ). Even without further discussion of the
merits of Kerstein’s own proposed revision, it is clear that it constitutes
a significant departure from the absolute prohibition articulated in Kant’s
original formulation (never merely as a means).
In the remainder of this article, I argue that a new look at the texts
suggests a novel account of Kant’s phrase, an account that avoids the
problems associated with the interpretations mentioned above and gives
the prohibition on using others ‘merely as a means’ the status of an
absolute proscription with determinate content. The interpretations
mentioned above explain the prohibition in terms of whether the persons
who are used (or treated or affected) do, can or could consent. The inter-
pretation developed below, by contrast, focuses the attention on the
agent’s practical reasoning and its proper relation to the consent of the
person who is used. I argue that Kant considers the actual consent of
someone who is used as a means to be a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the agent to avoid using this person merely as a means.
HOW TO USE SOMEONE ‘MERELY AS A MEANS ’
VOLUME 25 – 3 KANTIAN REVIEW 397
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000229
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 94.208.65.212, on 14 Aug 2020 at 11:04:11, subject to the
3. A New Proposal: An Agent-Focused Actual-Consent Account
I defend the following account of what constitutes using another merely
as a means:
An agent uses another person merely as a means if and only if ()
the agent uses another person as a means in the service of real-
izing her ends () without, as amatter ofmoral principle, making
this use conditional on the other’s consent; where () by ‘consent’
is meant the other’s genuine actual consent to being used, in a
particular manner, as a means to the agent’s end.
I shall clarify the three elements of this account in turn.
3.1. Using as a Means
The first condition without which we cannot properly say that an agent
uses a person ‘merely as a means’ is that the agent indeed uses the person
as a means to her end. It is trivial but nevertheless sometimes overlooked:
if an agent does not use a person as a means to her end at all, the agent
cannot be using the person merely as a means.
Importantly, Kant’s own terminology in the Formula of Humanity and
related discussions is that of ‘using’ someone (merely) as a means ([ge]
brauchen, G, : –). In current discussions of the phrase – including
those mentioned in section  above – however, the relevant relation is
often described as that of ‘treating’ persons (merely) as means. This
notion has a broader scope, because it also includes regarding persons
as being of potential use, or regarding persons in the way in which
one regards things, without actually using them.
I suspect that the introduction of the terminology of ‘treating’ is due to
several influential but infelicitous English translations. H. J. Paton and
Lewis White Beck, two of the most important Kant scholars of the
mid-twentieth century, translated Kant’s Formula of Humanity as a
prohibition on ‘treating’ humanity merely as means (Paton: ‘Act in such
a way that you always treat humanity : : : ’; Beck: ‘Act so that you treat
humanity : : : ’). They likely did so because ‘using : : : as an end’ sounds
awkward. Yet this is what Kant writes, and he repeats the phrase in the
Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals even more
bluntly. There he claims that any agent is morally constrained never to
use a subject merely as a means but always ‘simultaneously to use this
as itself an end’ (CPrR, : ) and that a human beingmust ‘always simul-
taneously be used as an end’ (MM, : ). The locution ‘using as an end’
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is probably best understood as meaning ‘using qua end’ or ‘in accordance
with its standing as an end’, that is, as indicating that one ought to use a
human being in away that is consistent with the latter’s moral standing as
an end in itself. In a similar vein Kant also speaks of ‘the use of [a being] as
a person’ (: ), rather than as a thing.
The infelicitous translation by Paton and Beck has substantial implica-
tions. Some of the difficulties currently associated with Kant’s Formula
of Humanity stem directly from taking the relevant phrase to be ‘treating
merely as a means’ rather than the narrower notion of ‘usingmerely as a
means’. Take, for example, the case in which a beneficent bystander
gives CPR to an unconscious jogger in a park. As mentioned above, some
authors claim that the bystander would be ‘treating’ the jogger ‘merely as
a means’ since, being unconscious, she cannot give consent. But when
Kant’s prohibition is read literally, as concerning cases of using others,
then the case of the unconscious jogger causes no problems. Suppose
you are a good Kantian and you are acting on your maxim of helping
others in need, a maxim you have adopted from duty. In this scenario
your end is to save the jogger’s life, and the means by which you realize
this end is your giving her CPR. You are not using the jogger as a means,
and hence by implication you are not using her merely as a means. (The
example is not that of an agent who is roaming the parks in search of
people to whom he could credibly give CPR just so as to become famous
as a life-saving hero.) In short, the worry that resuscitating the jogger
violates Kant’s prohibition is an artefact of an unfortunate translation.
Given the crucial importance of the phrase, let us consider the notion of
using someone as ameans, before focusing on the subset of cases in which
such use constitutes using a person merely as a means. What constitutes
using another person as a means? Importantly, we cannot establish
whether you are doing this by determining whether the other person hap-
pens to contribute causally to the realization of your ends. Others may
contribute to the realization of your ends even when you do not use them
as means, and even when you do not act at all. If I, of my own initiative,
buy food for you while you are sleeping because I know you want food,
then I satisfy one of your ends, but you are not using me as a means to get
food. You are asleep; I am the agent. To count as usingme as ameans, you
need to be acting in a certain way.
Your action can be described from an external narrator’s perspective or
in terms of your own practical reasoning, so we need to determine which
of these perspectives is the one adopted by Kant in this context. To
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illustrate the difference, let us suppose someone is at a music festival,
where it has gotten dark. She wants to rest, so she sits down on what
she believes to be a large bag, to avoid sitting in the mud. In reality,
she is sitting not on a bag but on a man who has drunk himself into a
coma. An external narrator might say that she is using the comatose
man as a means to sitting comfortably. But in terms of the woman’s
own beliefs and practical reasoning, this is not what she is doing. She
believes that she is using a bag. Unbeknownst to her, this happens to
be a man.
For the purpose of determining whether you qualify as using another
person as ameans in Kant’s sense, we need to describe the action by refer-
ence to your own perspective. In the Formula of Humanity, Kant
addresses you, the agent, directly (‘So act that you use : : : ’): you are told
to critically assess your own action principles (G, : –). Moreover,
when discussing his four examples in the Groundwork, explaining how
the agent in the first two cases would use a person merely as a means,
Kant takes as his point of reference what the agent ‘wills’ and ‘has in
mind’ and which ‘principle’ he would be acting on (G, : –).
He criticizes the agent for failing to take into account, in his practical rea-
soning, the fact that rational beings always simultaneously ought to be
valued as ends in themselves. All of this indicates that the relevant point
of reference is not the agent’s observable behaviour as described from an
external perspective, but the action as conceived in terms of the agent’s
own practical reasoning. I shall therefore assume the following: an agent
uses another person as a means if and only if, in the agent’s practical rea-
soning underlying the action, the other serves to realize or promote the
agent’s ends.
3.2. Using ‘Merely’ as a Means: The Consent Condition
Not every case of using another as a means constitutes a case of using the
other merely as a means. We need a second condition to identify the
proper subset of cases. This second condition is the following: an agent
uses someonemerely as ameans if and only if the agent uses someone as a
means without having made such use conditional, as a matter of moral
principle, on the used person’s consent. In the next section (.), I provide
the necessary textual support for the claim that the relevant consent is
best understood as actual consent. In this section, I focus on the role
of consent as a limiting condition.
Recall that whether an agent is ‘using’ another person is determined by
reference to the agent’s practical reasoning. The action principles from
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which agents reason practically are, in Kant’s terminology, the agents’
‘maxims’. Maxims are the general premises agents use in their
practical reasoning, that is, the principles on the basis of which they
act (G, : , n., and , n.; CPrR, : ). The notion of a maxim
is a familiar element of Kant’s ethics, but because he does not mention
maxims explicitly in the Formula of Humanity their importance is often
overlooked in accounts of ‘using merely as a means’.
Kant makes it very clear that the prohibition on using persons merely as
means articulates a maxim-related constraint. He rephrases the require-
ment articulated in the formula as follows:
[T]he formula [of humanity] says: that the rational being, as an
end by its nature and hence as an end in itself, must serve in every
maxim as the limiting condition of all merely relative and elective
ends. (G, : ; emphasis added)
He repeats this idea by stating that every rational being must simultane-
ously ‘count as an end in itself in yourmaxim’ (G, : –) and by saying
that rational beings ‘must be made to underlie all maxims of actions’ as
the ‘highest limiting condition in the use of all means’ (: ). There are
subtle differences between these formulations, and Kant does not make
his view entirely clear. The first two passages might seem to suggest that
the condition should be stated explicitly in each maxim. Yet this does not
actually appear to be what is required by the condition that rational
beings ‘serve’ and ‘count’ as ends in themselves in your maxims. Kant
does not include the condition explicitly in his own examples of morally
required maxims, nor does his reformulation in terms of the condition
having to ‘underlie’ one’s maxims suggest that it should be stated
expressly in the maxim. His idea, rather, seems to be that the condition
is to function as a general rider on one’s practical reasoning, imposing a
general moral constraint on one’s use of others as means to one’s ends.
Kant explains the nature of this constraint in terms of the consent of the
person who is used as a means. He explicates the meaning of the unusual
phrase ‘using as an end’ by contrasting it with ‘using as a thing’.Whether I
use a thing that I own is entirely up to me. By contrast, human beings are
persons, they exist not merely as means to my ends, but they are ‘ends in
themselves’ (G, : –). They morally cannot be owned and used as
property; this would be slavery. Persons have freedom, and the freedom
of others ‘limits’ mine (L-NR, : ). Whether I may use a person is
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therefore not entirely up to me. It depends on whether the other gives
consent.
This suggests that the constraint should be understood in terms of the
following moral principle: given the moral status of persons as ends in
themselves, it is morally impermissible for one person to use another
as a means, unless the other gives consent. If the other does not consent,
then the agent must find morally acceptable means, postpone his pursuit
of the end or give up the end (unless it is a morally obligatory end).
The distinction between using othersmerely as means and using others as
means but not merely as means can now be stated as follows: you use
othersmerely asmeans if and only if you use others as means to your ends
without making your use of them conditional on their consent. By con-
trast, you use them as means but not merely as means if and only if, as a
matter of moral principle, you make your use of others as means to your
ends conditional upon their consent.
3.3. Actual Consent
The third element of the proposed account of ‘using merely as a means’ is
the claim that the relevant consent is actual consent. Kant’s explanation
of the false promising example in the Groundwork is notoriously brief,
but a closer look at this example and other relevant texts confirms that the
required type of consent is actual consent.
Recall that Kant starts his example in theGroundwork by stating that the
person who contemplates making a false promise to repay a loan ‘will see
at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a
means, without the other at the same time containing in himself the
end’ (: , emphasis added). By introducing the case as one in which
the other does not simultaneously contain the agent’s end, Kant presents
it as a case in which actual consent is lacking. In the second sentence he
explains why the other does not simultaneously contain the end, namely
because he cannot possibly contain it: ‘For he whom I want to use for my
purposes by such a [false] promise cannot possibly consent to my way
of behaving toward him and so himself contain the end of this action’
(: –). After all, he is being deceived as to the agent’s real end.
In the literature, this second sentence is often taken to be Kant’s primary
statement of the relevant criterion. This explains the prevalence of the
different ‘possible consent’ accounts discussed above. But Kant in fact
starts the example by pointing to the absence of actual consent. He
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subsequently mentions the impossibility of consent as an explanation of
its absence. Thus, the relevant type of consent in his example is actual
consent.
Other texts similarly reveal that Kant understands the Formula of
Humanity as requiring actual consent. In the Feyerabend Lectures on
Natural Law, the transcript of a course he taught during the months
in which he was writing the Groundwork, he is reported to have said:
‘When I make a contract with a servant, he must also be an end : : :
and not merely a means. He must also will it. (Er muß auch wollen;
L-NR, : ; emphasis added)
In theMetaphysics ofMorals, we findmany other passages in which Kant
stresses the importance of actual consent. Here he again emphasizes that
an agent’s use of servants requires their actual consent (: ). It requires
a contract, which involves a simultaneous declaration of will (: ).
Servants retain the right to revoke their consent and terminate the con-
tract (: ), but as long as the contract remains in force, the employer
can ‘make direct use of a person : : : as a means to [the employer’s] end,
: : : without infringing upon his personality’ (: –). The require-
ment of actual consent applies to all cases in which one person wants to
make use of the powers or property of another (: , cf. –).
Importantly, Kant’s loan example in the Groundwork is a case in point.
A loan is not a real loan (but a case of misappropriation) if the lender does
not give genuine actual consent to lending the money. The lender ‘must
also will it’.
In addition, Kant’s servant and loan examples clarify that the object of the
required actual consent is not the agent’s maxim. An employer’s maxim
may well be a maxim that a potential employee wholeheartedly can or
does endorse – for example the maxim ‘when hiring employees, I shall
offer them fair terms of employment’ – but unless the potential employee
actually agrees to take the job, the employer cannot permissibly make use
of his services. The employee ‘must alsowill it’. The prospective employee
may have reasons of his own to prefer another job elsewhere: perhaps the
pay is better or the work more agreeable. In other words, for us to avoid
using others merely as means, it is not sufficient that those whom we use
as means can or do consent to our maxims. We need to secure their genu-
ine actual consent to our using them as means to our ends in a specific
way. The relevant object of consent, then, is not our maxim but the
use we want to make of the other as a means towards our end.
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Its focus on the agent’s practical reasoning makes the proposed account
fundamentally different from the actual consent reading mentioned first
in section , to which I shall now refer as the ‘bare actual consent’
account. There, the criterion governing whether an agent uses someone
merely as ameanswas phrased solely in terms of a condition on the side of
the person used: their actual consent. By contrast, on the agent-focused
reading proposed here, the criterion is phrased in terms of a condition on
the side of the agent. On this reading of Kant, it is not morally sufficient
that others happen to consent; the agent must have made his use of others
conditional upon their consent, as amatter ofmoral principle. As a result,
although both accounts attribute a crucial role to actual consent, on the
agent-focused actual-consent interpretation Kant’s prohibition turns out
to be more demanding, as illustrated with the genocidal dictator example
in the next section.
Some further clarifications concerning the required consent are in order.
First, actual consent needs to satisfy certain normative criteria in order
genuinely to count as actual consent. As mentioned, apparent consent
could in fact be spurious, for example if it is the result of deceit, misin-
formation, misunderstanding or manipulation. Furthermore, in order
to be able to give genuine consent, the person whom you want to use
as means needs to be mentally competent and mature enough, and the
person also needs to have and understand the relevant information.
The person needs to know which end you want him to serve, how you
plan to use him, what this will require of him and so on.Genuine agree-
ment between two parties presupposes that they have a shared under-
standing of the agreement and a ‘united will’ (MM, : –). A full
specification of Kant’s account of the requirements for genuine actual
consent also involves determining whether consent should always be
explicit, whether consent to a general policy implies consent to its specific
applications, and so on.
Second, it is important to note that those who give consent ought to
meet specific moral requirements governing their own agency. Kant
emphasizes that you ought not to use yourself merely as a means either
(G, : ,MM, : –), and this poses constraints on the types of use
to which you are morally allowed to consent (cf. MM, : ). You
should not consent to being used as an accomplice in a scheme of
deception, for example, and you should not agree to sell yourself into
slavery. Thus there is a set of normative conditions that should be met
by anyone who is asked to serve as a means. Agents intending to use
others as means in turn ought to take these conditions into account when
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asking for consent, since they must not ask others for their consent to
being used in degrading or otherwise morally impermissible ways. Not
all moral conditions that govern the giving of consent are negative, of
course. On Kant’s view you have a duty of beneficence, so under certain
circumstances you may well have a moral duty to consent. But note that
even when you ought to consent, using you without your consent still
counts as using youmerely as ameans. Kant’s Formula ofHumanity does
not permit, say, tricking an egoist into contributing to a good cause.
Providing a full account of Kant’s conception of genuine actual consent,
as well as of themorality of giving and requesting consent, lies beyond the
scope of this article.
4. Advantages of the Agent-Focused Actual-Consent Account
In the previous section, I argued for the agent-focused actual-consent
interpretation of Kant’s prohibition on the basis of textual evidence. In
this section, I examinewhether it can avoid the difficulties associatedwith
alternative interpretations. Let us revisit the interpretations mentioned in
section .
4.1. Bare Actual Consent to Being Used, in a Particular Manner, as a
Means to the Agent’s End
We already saw that the restriction to cases of use (rather than treatment)
obviates the worry regarding the unconscious jogger in need of
resuscitation: the beneficent Kantian does not use her as a means and,
by implication, not merely as a means.
In the example of the genocidal dictator, the proposed agent-focused
actual-consent account leads to different results than the bare actual con-
sent account. On the proposed account, the act-utilitarian’s consent does
not suffice for the dictator to avoid using him ‘merely’ as a means. When
we look at the genocidal dictator’s practical reasoning, it becomes clear
that she indeed uses all of her victims merely as means. Whatever maxim
she is reasoning from, she patently fails to limit her use of others to cases
in which they consent. The fact that the act-utilitarian happens to consent
makes no difference to this assessment of the dictator’smanner of acting.
We reach the same result if we modify the example such that the dictator
uses her victims’ consent as a selection criterion without treating their
consent as a moral constraint. Imagine she decides to use only victims
who happen to consent – say, because she perversely finds this funny.
Although she restricts herself to using consenting victims, she does not
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‘simultaneously use them as ends’. She acts purely on the basis of her con-
tingent personal preference and uses others as she pleases. If she felt like it,
she would instead select those who protest most loudly.
In a similar manner, the proposed account of Kant’s prohibition can han-
dle cases of consensual enslavement and cases of consent in the context of
enslavement. A slave master uses enslaved persons merely as means,
regardless of whether they happen to consent to the use hemakes of them.
After all, were he to adopt the principle of using them only on condition
that they consent, theywould effectively no longer be his slaves (onKant’s
understanding of the term,MM, : ). Furthermore, when two people
voluntarily enter into a master–slave relationship, the prospective master
must adopt, at that moment, the principle of using the slave as a means to
his endswithoutmaking this use conditional upon the slave’s consent. By
adopting this principle and using his slave, he clearly violates Kant’s
prohibition on using others ‘merely as means’. And if a slave master
allows his slaves to rest during the hottest part of the day, he still counts
as using themmerely asmeans, even though he gives them something they
want. For he is not limiting his use of them, as amatter of moral principle,
to that to which they consent. He is using them as slaves, and the decision
whether to let them rest is solely up to him.
4.2. Possible Rational Consent to Being Used as Means to
the Agent’s End
Unlike the possible rational consent account, the proposed account does
not imply that an agent may permissibly use others as means without
their actual consent, let alone over and against their explicit dissent.
Their actual consent serves as a limiting condition. Thus, contrary to
Parfit’s claim, the agent on the footbridge does use the heavy man merely
as ameanswhen she uses him as a trolley stopper to save five others. She
uses him as a means to her end, without his consent, so she clearly fails to
respect the morally required limiting condition.
4.3. Possible Consent to the Action
The fact that the proposed account covers all cases of instrumental use
ensures that its construal of the criterion is not too narrow. It is not
restricted to those cases in which the nature of the action makes consent
impossible. It can deal with the case of organ harvesting as well as with
the false promising example. It follows straightforwardly from the pro-
posed interpretation that if a surgeon uses a healthy person’s organs to
save the lives of five patients, without the person’s consent, this surgeon
uses the person merely as a means.
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4.4. Possible Consent to the Maxim
Finally, the fact that the account covers only cases of instrumental use
ensures that the criterion is not too wide. The restriction to cases of
use implies that cases such as the drowning example do not get classified
as instances of the agent’s using someone merely as a means. The agent in
the drowning case is not using the drowning person as a means to her
ends, and by implication she is not using the drowning person merely
as a means.
This result should not be misunderstood as implying that the agent is act-
ing permissibly in letting the person drown. The prohibition against using
someone ‘merely as a means’ is only one part of the Formula of
Humanity; obeying it does not exhaust your moral duties. Kant claims
that the formula requires that you ‘promote’ humanity as an end in itself
(G, : ). His first two examples in theGroundwork are cases in which
the agent violates this requirement by using humanity merely as a means.
The third and fourth examples are cases in which the agent does not do
this but nevertheless violates the requirement of promoting humanity as
an end. Even without a detailed specification of what the latter require-
ment entails – which lies beyond the scope of this article – it is clear from
Kant’s fourth example, which involves a person who refuses to help
others in need, that you violate this requirement if you refuse to help a
drowning person out of self-interest or moral indifference. Doing so is
morally wrong, but this is a different type of violation than that of using
someone merely as a means (G, : –). The same goes for humilia-
tion and contempt: these do not involve the use of others merely asmeans,
but they are nevertheless impermissible (MM, : –).
5. A Worry about Consistency
One scenario mentioned parenthetically in section  requires further
discussion, as it might seem to expose a problem for the proposed inter-
pretation of Kant’s conception of using others merely as means. This is
the case of the wannabe hero roaming the parks, who could not care less
about promoting the ends of others and resuscitates the unconscious jog-
ger solely in order to become famous.Hewould be using her as ameans to
his own greater glory, and hewould also be using hermerely as ameans in
resuscitating her, given that he goes ahead even though, being uncon-
scious, she does not give consent. But if using others merely as means
is morally prohibited, then it might seem to follow that it is morally
impermissible for him to resuscitate the jogger. Alternatively, if it is
morally permissible for him to resuscitate the jogger, then it might seem
to follow that it is permissible to use others merely as means, at least in
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some cases. Both results would be problematic. The first would attrib-
ute to Kant the view that resuscitating the jogger would be morally right
for one agent and wrong for another on account of their different
motives, which would contradict Kant’s own claim that beneficent
actions are ‘in accord with duty’ even if they are not performed ‘from
duty’ but from self-interest (G, : ). The second would contradict
the wording of Kant’s Formula of Humanity (‘nevermerely as a means’).
Either way, the agent-focused account might seem to yield inconsisten-
cies, and it might therefore appear to face a significant difficulty of its
own. The response to this worry requires a discussion of the relation
between the permissibility of the outward action and the permissibility
of the agent’s underlying maxim.
Let us assume that thewannabe hero is indeed using the joggermerely as a
means. He acts strictly from self-interest and fails to make his use of
others conditional on their agreement. He uses the jogger merely as a
means to his own greater glory. He has not adopted the maxim of benefi-
cence and would let the unconscious die by the side of the road if it were
not for the fact that he needs to resuscitate them to achieve his goal.
Second, let us also assume that resuscitating the jogger is indeed ‘in accord
with duty’ and at least morally permissible if not required by the Kantian
duty of beneficence (which includes the duty to render assistance). The
question is, then, whether these two assumptions are compatible. Can
the claim that the wannabe hero is using the jogger merely as a means
be made compatible with the claim that his resuscitating her is
permissible?
The first thing to note is that he violates at least two Kantian duties: he
violates both the perfect duty of respect and the imperfect duty of benefi-
cence. He violates the duty of respect by using the woman, without her
consent, as ameans in the service of his personal project of acquiring fame
(cf.MM, : , ). It might sound odd to say that he also violates the
duty of beneficence, given that he would be saving her life. Within Kant’s
ethics, however, imperfect duties are duties to adopt certain maxims. By
adopting the impermissible maxim of self-interest, rather than the
morally obligatory maxim of beneficence, he violates the duty of benefi-
cence (: –).
The fact that he acts on the impermissible maxim of self-interest in noway
implies, however, that it is impermissible for him to resuscitate the jogger.
This point can be explained with the help of Kant’s own parallel example
of a shopkeeper who refrains from overcharging children, not on the
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basis of the morally required maxim of honesty but on the basis of the
morally impermissible maxim of self-interest (G, : ). This shop-
keeper is acting from self-interest rather than from duty. Nevertheless,
Kant claims that his pricing is ‘in accord with duty’, since it happens
to match the pricing required by the duty of honesty. Put in more
colloquial terms, he does the right thing (he refrains from overcharging
children), but he does it for the wrong reason (he does it on the basis of his
maxim of self-interest). In sum, the fact that the shopkeeper acts on the
basis of the impermissible maxim of self-interest does not make his action
impermissible (charging children the regular price).
By parity of reasoning, the fact that the wannabe hero acts on the basis of
the impermissible maxim of self-interest does not make his action imper-
missible (resuscitating the jogger). If morality demands that he resuscitate
the jogger, the wannabe hero’s administering CPR is ‘in accord with
duty’, even though he acts from self-interest rather than ‘from duty’.
His administering CPR has the same moral status as the shopkeeper’s
charging children the regular price. It is not impermissible for him to save
the jogger’s life.
Thus Kant’s shopkeeper example highlights the importance of distin-
guishing the evaluation of an outward action from the evaluation of
the agent’s underlying practical reasoning. When Kant asks whether
an outward action is ‘in accord with duty’, he abstracts from the agent’s
reasons for performing it. When he asks whether an agent uses
someone merely as a means, by contrast, he focuses on the practical
reasoning that underlies the agent’s action. The wannabe hero’s action
(resuscitating the jogger) is in accord with duty and hence at least
permissible. But he reasons from the maxim of self-interest and uses
the jogger merely as a means towards his own greater glory, and this
is morally impermissible.
The worry that the proposed account of ‘using another merely as a
means’ entails that it would be morally prohibited for the wannabe hero
to save the jogger – or, alternatively, that using others merely as means
would sometimes be permissible – conflates the moral evaluation of the
actionwith themoral evaluation of the agent’s maxim (and the associated
practical reasoning). When, in the statement of the worry, it is assumed
that resuscitating the jogger is permissible, the focus is on the outward
action in abstraction from the agent’s reasoning. When it is pointed
out that the wannabe hero is using the jogger merely as a means, by con-
trast, the focus is on his underlyingmaxim and his reasoning on its basis.
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As the structure of Kant’s shopkeeper example helps us recognize, the
judgement that the wannabe hero’s action is ‘in accord with duty’ is
compatible with the thesis that his underlying maxim is morally imper-
missible. Conversely, the fact that he uses the jogger merely as a means
does not entail that it is morally impermissible for him to resuscitate the
jogger.
In sum, the claim that it is morally permissible for the wannabe hero to
resuscitate the jogger is indeed compatible with the claim that it is imper-
missible for him to use her merely as a means in doing so, and the alleged
inconsistencies do not emerge.
6. Concluding Remarks
The textual evidence indicates that the prohibition on using others merely
as means demands that you make the use of others as means to your ends
conditional on their genuine actual consent, as a matter of moral princi-
ple. Understood in this way, the prohibition articulates a concrete moral
guideline that combines a characteristically Kantian focus on the agent’s
practical reasoning with the equally characteristically Kantian emphasis
on the moral standing of persons as ends in themselves. Moreover, this
account of the prohibition avoids the difficulties associated with alterna-
tive interpretations.
As a final comment, let me note that this account also fits well with widely
shared moral convictions about the importance of informed consent,
convictions that are generally believed to have Kantian provenance.
‘Informed consent’ requirements, for example in medical research involv-
ing human subjects, are generally understood as imposing an obligation
on the researcher. The researcher ought to use human test subjects only
on condition that they genuinely consent to her using them in the pro-
posed manner and for the stated end. Whether she properly discharges
this duty depends not on whether her test subjects just happen to consent.
Rather, it depends on whether she makes their participation in the study
conditional upon their genuine actual consent, by following procedures
designed to ensure that potential test subjects receive and understand the
necessary information and participate voluntarily. This common under-
standing of informed consent requirements fully matches Kant’s
prohibition as understood on the agent-focused actual-consent account
developed in this article; it matches the prohibition only partially, or
not at all, when this prohibition is interpreted along the lines of the alter-
native accounts discussed above. Hence the account offered here also
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closes the current gap between the scholarly interpretation of Kant’s
prohibition and important ethical codes that are believed to be inspired
by it.
Notes
 This verdict is found in introductory texts as well as in the scholarly literature. See e.g.
Russ Shafer-Landau’s (: ) discussion of the problem of ‘vagueness’, in his widely
used introduction to ethics, or Henry Allison’s statement that the Formula of Humanity
‘seems more like an exhortation than a practical guide’ (Allison : , with further
references to similar statements by others).
 The important role of actual consent in the discussion to followmight raise doubts about
the very possibility of developing a unified account that is applicable both to the use of
others and to the use of oneself. It might seem that one cannot fail to consent to one’s own
proposals. Kant clearly holds a different view, however. He claims that using oneself
merely as a means involves inner disagreement. He conceives of it as a form of self-
betrayal and asserts that one’s own conscience repudiates it (e.g. MM, : –).
Furthermore, he suggests that duties to oneself are in some respects analogous to duties
to others (Eth-Vigil, : ).
 Despite his own condemnation of using others ‘merely as means’, until the mid-s
Kant failed to object to the enslavement of those he racialized as non-white. On the
details of Kant’s views on race, see Kleingeld (). On the resulting tensions in his
work of the s, see Kleingeld (). There I also discuss Kant’s sexism and explain
why I take over Kant’s use of male pronouns when describing his arguments and
examples.
 References are to Kant‘s gesammelte Schriften, published under the auspices of
the Berlin-Brandenburg (formerly Royal Prussian) and Göttingen Academies
(Berlin: De Gruyter and predecessors, –). CPrR = Critique of Practical Reason;
Eth-C = Collins Lectures on Moral Philosophy; Eth-Vigil = Vigilantius Lectures on
Ethics; G = Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals; L-NR = Feyerabend
Lectures on Natural Law; MM = Metaphysics of Morals. Translations are from the
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Kant, with some modifications.
 Thus, ‘humanity’ should not be equated with the mere capacity for instrumental reason-
ing; it also includes the capacity to set moral ends. For detailed criticism of the claim that
‘humanity’ in the Groundwork should be understood as the capacity for instrumental
reasoning, see Allison (: –). For further discussion of Kant’s notion of
‘humanity’ and ‘rational nature’ and the relevant debates, see Dean (), Denis
(, ), Sensen (: –) and Timmermann (: –).
 This is the maxim as specified by Kant when he first introduces the example (G, : ).
Kant starts the second round of discussion of the examples by saying that he wants ‘to
keep to the preceding examples’ (: ), so we should assume the agent to act on the
same maxim in both rounds.
 This is also true of Lina Papadaki’s slightly different rational consent account (Papadaki
: ).
 Note that this parallels the result of Korsgaard’s application of the Formula of Universal
Law, which leads to the ‘problem of natural violence’ (Korsgaard : –). Note
also that the organ transplant example is the moral equivalent (and philosophical ances-
tor) of the footbridge case discussed by Parfit. Because the footbridge case sometimes
prompts discussion about details of the scenario, such as whether the agent can really
be said to know that the heavy man will die, I use the organ harvesting scenario here.
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 Because it lies beyond the scope of this article to determine the conditions under which it
is morally permissible for persons to give consent (in this case consent to having their
organs removed), I bracket cases of voluntary removal.
 This problem also poses itself for the related interpretation in terms of possible end shar-
ing. Following a suggestion byKorsgaard, Allison (: ) asserts that Kant’s point is
that ‘the false promiser is treating the promisee merely as a means’, since ‘the end of [his]
action cannot be shared by the one being used as a means’. This ‘possible end sharing’
account also implies that the case of organ harvesting does not violate the prohibition on
using others merely as means. It is possible for someone – e.g., a radical altruist or act-
utilitarian – to share the agent’s end of saving the greater number and agree to being used
as a means to this end.
 In this chapter, unlike her subsequent chapter which is based on a later article, O’Neill
does not yet differentiate between ‘using as a means’ and ‘using merely as a means’; here,
she regards any form of ‘using’ others as morally prohibited.
 For Kerstein’s own proposed revised version of the principle, see Kerstein (: ;
: ).
 Paton’s translation, under the title Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, was first
published in ; Beck’s, under the title Foundations of theMetaphysics ofMorals, was
first published in . Several translations give ‘use’, including Mary Gregor’s 
translation in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: ‘So act that
you use humanity : : : ’ It lies beyond the scope of this article to trace the translation his-
tory in more detail.
 Kant uses the term ‘treating’ (behandeln) instead of ‘using’ at least once (G, : ). This
is compatible with ‘using’ being the primary term, since ‘using’ is of course a form of
‘treating’. But not all ‘treating’ involves ‘using’, which is why it is more precise and hence
preferable to employ Kant’s terminology of ‘using’ when discussing the final phrase of
the Formula of Humanity.
 A related case sometimes discussed in this context is that of a police officer arresting
criminals. Let us assume that the persons who are arrested are convicted criminals
who escaped after a fair trial. If they do not consent to being arrested, is the officer using
themmerely as ameans?Here it seems that, if the police officer’s end is to arrest criminals
in accordance with legal procedures, then she is not using them as means: inmaking the
arrests she is realizing her objective directly, rather than requiring their arrest as a means
to her end. Furthermore, her holding criminals legally accountable is consistent with
their status as persons. By contrast, an officer who arrests and ‘frames’ an innocent per-
son, as a means to prevent riots, does use this person merely as a means. A discussion of
further permutations of this scenario requires antecedent discussion of Kant’s republican
political theory and his justification of legal coercion, which lies beyond the scope of this
article. I thank Martin Sticker and Garrath Williams for helpful discussions of this case.
 Kant problematically assigns to servants the status of ‘dependants’ in the household, on a
par with children and domestic animals. The problems connected with this view do not
affect the analysis of the meaning of ‘using merely as a means’, however.
 Tatiana Patrone () argues that, according to Kant, no use of others as means is ever
morally permissible. This passage from the Metaphysics of Morals, and several others
cited in this article, offer counter-examples.
 Just how detailed this information needs to be is a matter of debate, see e.g. O’Neill
().
 The example is from Parfit (: vol. , ); see also Wood (: ).
 Note that by focusing strictly on cases of ‘use’ (not ‘treatment’), the proposed account
avoids the conclusion (drawn by Papadaki : ) that the agent on the footbridge
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would violate Kant’s prohibition either way. Here I agree with Kerstein (: ):
‘that you allow the five to be killed does not entail that you are using them’.
 For an argument that the interpretation of ‘using merely as a means’ proposed in this
article can fruitfully be used to develop a solution to the Trolley Problem, see
Kleingeld ().
 I thank Andrew Chignell for raising this issue.
 This is a variation on Parfit’s coffee-buying gangster objection (Parfit : vol. , ).
 For Kant’s argument that this maxim is impermissible, see MM, : .
 See also leading ethical codes such as the Belmont Report and the research guidelines of
the NIH and the World Health Organization. Note that securing informed consent is of
course not the only moral requirement researchers ought to satisfy.
 I thank audiences at Emory, Princeton, LSE, Keele, Oldenburg, Kaliningrad, Catania,
Groningen, the University of Amsterdam, the Humboldt University in Berlin and the
 meeting of the Society for Applied Philosophy for helpful comments on earlier
versions of this article. I also benefited from detailed comments from two anonymous
referees for this journal, Adam Cureton, Alec Walen, Andrew Chignell, Beate
Roessler, Fleur Jongepier, Garrath Williams, Jan-Willem Wieland, Joel Anderson,
John Walsh, Marijana Vujosevic, Martin Sticker, Michael Gregory, Sabine van
Haaren, Suzanne Jacobi, Susan Wolf and Sven Nyholm. I am grateful to the Dutch
Research Council (NWO) for research support.
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